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THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT
AT-WILL RULE: ILLINOIS CREATES AN
AMORPHOUS TORT
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.
85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)
DAVID PECK, 1982*
Illinois and most other American jurisdictions have adopted the
termination-at-will rule which permits an employer to discharge an
employee without notice and without cause, unless the duration of the
employment relationship is specified in an employment contract.'
Most jurisdictions today still follow this basic common law rule2 that
sanctions an employer's unfettered right to discharge an employee "for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without
being guilty of a legal wrong."' 3 Justifications currently advanced for
* B.A., Carleton College, 1973; M.A., Indiana University, 1977, J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1982.
I. 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. 1967).
See generally 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant, § 8 (1948); 53 AM. JUR. 2d, Master and Servant, §§ 34,
43 (1970). Some examples of the application of the termination-at-will rule are: Pearson v.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Hablas
v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Comerford v. International Harvester Co., 235 Ala.
376, 178 So. 894 (1938); Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964); May v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390 (1962); Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,
456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587
(1967). See also Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 118-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Feinman, Employment at Will]; Comment, Employ-
ment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 212 (1973). For an excellent
analysis of the contractual limitations on an employer's right of discharge, see Comment, Job
Securityfor the At Will Employee.- Contractual Right of Dischargefor Cause, 57 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 697 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Contractual Right of Discharge].
2. The common law rule that an employment for an indefinite term is regarded as an em-
ployment at-will which may be terminated at any time by either party for any reason has been
widely recognized. See, e.g., Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 36 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984
(1974); Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974); Coey v. Burwell Nur-
series, 2 Ohio App. 2d 102, 206 N.E.2d 577 (1965); Sooner Broadcasting Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d
457 (Okla. 1955); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., I I Utah 2d 1. 354 P.2d 559 (1960).
3. Payne v. Western Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). The Tennessee Supreme Court
set forth the classic statement of the employment at-will doctrine:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to dis-
charge or retain employes at will for good cause or for no cause or even for bad cause
without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employe
may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as
the employer.
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the rule include the employer's right to govern the direction of his busi-
ness, 4 the rule of mutuality of contract,5 and the avoidance of frivolous
lawsuits. 6 The rationale behind the mutuality of contract theory is that,
if the employee is free to quit at any time, the employer should then be
free to dismiss him at any time.
Recently however, in Illinois and elsewhere, judicial decisions7
and legislative enactments8 have begun to recognize that the mutuality
rule can no longer be justified because, "with the rise of large corpora-
tions" employing "relatively immobile workers who often have no
other place to market their skills,"9 the employer can easily bend the
Id. at 518-19.
4. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super 335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979),rev'd, 84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977); O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., 42 R.I. 479, 108 A. 887 (1920). The Fortune
court stated: "We do not question the general principles that an employer is entitled to be moti-
vated by and to serve its own legitimate business interests . . . . We recognize the employer's
need for a large amount of control over its work force." 373 Mass. at 101-02, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
See also Comment, Contracts-Termination of Employment at Will-Public Policy May Modfy
Employer's Right to Discharge, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 624 (1960).
5. Mutuality of contract requires that both parties are bound or neither is bound to the
contract. Symmetry is the crux of this definition of mutuality. Accordingly, terminable-at-will
employment contracts are valid because neither party is bound to the agreement. For examples of
the mutuality of contract rule, see Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) ("So the
right of the employ6 to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the
right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6");
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndi-
cate Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932) ("An employee is never presumed to engage his
services permanently, thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition...
[1f the contract of employment be not binding on the employee ...then it cannot be binding
upon the employer; there would be lack of 'mutuality' "); Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R. Co., 136 Miss.
38, 100 So. 585 (1924); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272,petition
for discretionary review denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978). See generally Blades, Employ-
ment at Will vs. Individual Freedom. On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]; Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Summers,
Time for a Statute]; Note, Contract Law. An Alternative to Tort Law as a Basis for Wrongful
Discharge Actions in Illinois, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 861, 873-76 (1981).
6. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Pierce v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979), rev'd, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980). See also Blades, supra note 5, at 1428 ("there is the danger that the average jury will
identify with, and therefore believe, the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious
lawsuits by disgruntled employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion.").
7. A growing number of state courts in the last few years have held that a termination
violating public policy or motivated by bad faith or malice provides a sufficient basis for a wrong-
ful discharge claim sounding in tort and/or contract. For examples of state courts which have
been receptive to wrongful discharge actions brought by at-will employees against their former
employers, see Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised By At Will Employees.- A New Legal
Concern for Employers, 332 LAB. L.J. 265-69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Olsen].
8. For examples of state laws limiting the employer's absolute discharge power, see [1979] 1
LAB. L. REP. [State Laws (CCH)] 43045, 43055. See also, [1981] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
51:501-23.
9. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1980),
rev'g in part, 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (1980), citing Blades, supra note 5, at 1405.
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will of his employee to his own by the threat of discharge. To rectify
this imbalance, courts have begun to look for ways to interject greater
equality into the relationship of management and the at-will employee.
Courts, however, have split as to the best method for curbing the abso-
lute power of the employer to discharge the at-will employee who is
otherwise defenseless against employer coercion and caprice.' 0 While
some courts permit an employee's right of action for breach of contract
where the employee is terminated in bad faith," other courts have re-
cently recognized a tort action for wrongful discharge,' 2 commonly re-
ferred to as the tort of retaliatory discharge.' 3 At least one
commentator 4 and a number of state and district courts 15 have argued
that the legislature should act to repeal the harsh common law doctrine
by statutorily articulating the right of employees not to be discharged
except for just cause. A carefully drafted statute would give at-will em-
ployees substantially the same protection with regard to discharges as
that now enjoyed by employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements. ' 6
10. "It is the fear of being discharged which above all else renders the great majority of
employees vulnerable to employer coercion." Blades, supra note 5, at 1406. See also Summers,
Timefor a Statute, supra note 5; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Job Security].
11. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56
(1977) ("a written contract [between the employer and employee] contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a breach of the
contract."); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employee terminated
because she refused to date her foreman was a termination made in bad faith and thus constituted
a breach of the employment contract).
12. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 5; Comment, Protecting the Private Sector at Will Employee
Who "Blows the Whistle" A Cause ofAction Based Upon Determinants ofPublic Policy, 1977 Wis.
L. REV. 777, 788-811 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Whistleblowing].
13. The tort of abusive or retaliatory discharge holds employers liable for dismissals in re-
sponse to employee activity that is protected by public policy. Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978).
14. Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5, at 519-24.
15. See, e.g., McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
16. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. IV
1974), guarantees the right to bargain collectively. Seventy-nine percent of the collective bargain-
ing agreements surveyed provided that employees could not be discharged without "cause" or
"just cause". [1979] 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1.
Employees who happen to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement may not be allowed to
bring an independent tort action for discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim. See Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 III. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (3d Dist. 1980) (the
term "just cause", contained within a collective bargaining agreement prohibiting an employee's
termination except for just cause, is sufficiently broad and flexible to include retaliatory discharge
for filing a worker's compensation action). The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
held in Cook that where an employee employed under a labor union contract is discharged for
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In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. '7 the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether an employee has stated a cause of
action for the tort of retaliatory discharge' 8 by alleging that he was
terminated in violation of public policy. The Palmateer court held that
the plaintiff stated a cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge
by alleging that he was discharged "in contravention of a clearly man-
dated public policy."' 9
Although the term "public policy" cannot be precisely defined, 20
the court defined the term as concerning "what is right and just and
what affects the citizens of the state collectively."' 2' Public policy
should be distinguished from matters which are purely personal.22 The
court in Palmateer stated that "[t]he foundation of the tort of retalia-
tory discharge lies in the protection of public policy, and there is a clear
public policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal of-
fenses."'23 The court recognized a cause of action based on public pol-
filing a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee is limited to a claim for
breach of contract, and before any suit can be filed, the employee must exhaust all available
remedies, including the stipulated grievance procedure. The First District reached an opposite
conclusion in Wyatt v. Jewel Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E. 2d 1053 (1982). Relying on Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), the Wyatt court held that a union em-
ployee's tort action for retaliatory discharge was not barred by the exclusive contractual remedies
provided in the employee's collective bargaining agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court may be
called upon to resolve the conflict between the Wyatt and Cook decisions.
17. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), rev'g, 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (1980).
18. This comment shall use the terms "abusive discharge" and "retaliatory discharge" inter-
changeably to encompass situations where the employer, motivated by improper reasons, dis-
misses the at-will employee without cause.
19. 85 Ill. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
20. Most courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, have been reluctant to define ade-
quately the term "public policy" in a context of wrongful discharge actions. Although most deci-
sions are premised upon a finding that a specific public policy has been violated, the courts have
left no instruction as to how the finding was reached. See Abramson and Silvestri, Restrictions on
the Right ofan Employer to Discharge At Will" The Actionfor Wrongful Discharge, 40 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 177, 180 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Actionfor Wrongful Discharge]. In Leach v. Lau-
hoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977), the Illinois Appellate Court
defined public policy as "that principle of law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." Id. at 1024,
366 N.E.2d at 1147, quoting People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 11. 288, 294, 22
N.E. 798, 803 (1889). Another statement, perhaps just as confusing and vague as the Leach defini-
tion, defines public policy as anything which contravenes good morals or any established interest
of society. See 72 C.J.S. Policy 212 and cases cited therein.
21. 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
22. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1981).
The majority stated:
Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of
public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving
retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort [of retaliatory discharge] will be
allowed.
23. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
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icy for an employee discharged because he agreed to cooperate with
law enforcement officials in a criminal investigation of a fellow
employee.
This comment will first examine recent decisions of other jurisdic-
tions which have abandoned the at-will rule in favor of a contract, tort
or statutory remedy for a wrongfully discharged employee. The history
of Palmateer in the lower courts will then be discussed, and the
supreme court's reasoning will be analyzed. Finally, a critical analysis
of the court's decision and its potential impact on future case law will
be presented.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The practice of terminating employment at the will of either party
was not the rule in early England. 24 Rather, the law presumed that the
parties intended that a "general" or "indefinite" hiring was one from
year to year, terminable only at the end of a year.25 During the nine-
teenth century the English common law developed a rule that, absent
cause for discharge, employment was terminable only after a notice
period fixed by the custom of the trade.26
American courts have long since abandoned the English approach
and adopted the at-will doctrine which presumes that the employment
contract is terminable at the will of either party in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary.27 These courts subscribed to the
"laissez-faire" theory that the government foster rapid economic
growth by exercising as little control as possible in trade and industry.28
The courts, seeking to encourage industrial growth by insulating the
employer from liability for abusive firings,29 developed the employ-
ment-at-will rule.30 In Adair v. United States3t and Coppage v. Kan-
24. Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note I, at 119-22.
25. Id. at 120, citing, I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425. See Douglass v. Merchants'
Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484, 488, 23 N.E. 806, 807 (1890); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255, 257, 69 Am.
Dec. 694, 695 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431, 433-34 (1882). See generally I C.
LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 156 (2d ed. 1913).
26. Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5, at 485.
27. Id. See also Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 125 N.W. 812 (1910) (terminable-at-will
doctrine so well established that it requires no citation).
28. See Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1081,
1083-84 (1973); Note,4 Common Law Actionfor the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1435, 1441 (1975) [hereinafter cited asAbusive Discharge]; Job Security, supra note 10, at 342-
43.
29. See Feinman, Employment.At Will, supra note 1, at 131-35;AIbusive Discharge, supra note
28, at 1440.
30. See Job Security, supra note 10, at 342-43.
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sas,32 the United States Supreme Court held that legislation which
interferes with the employment relationship violates the employer's
freedom to contract. This judicial attitude, which condones discharge
of employees without cause, came about in response to declining prices
and severe economic depression in which economic stability could best
be achieved by permitting employers to discharge their employees
without cause.33
Modem criticism of the terminable-at-will doctrine centers upon
the employer's absolute right to discharge the at-will employee. 34
Under this doctrine the employee is defenseless against the threat of
discharge and therefore vulnerable to employer coercion and caprice. 35
In a highly technological society with specialized jobs requiring years
of training, the employee, because of his comparative immobility, will
gradually become more easily oppressed by the threats of his
employer.36
The last seventy-five years have witnessed significant modifica-
tions of the at-will rule which were developed in order to protect indi-
vidual workers from the coercive power of their employers. 37 Although
the presumption that employment is at-will remains almost un-
touched, 38 federal legislation has greatly restricted an employer's free-
dom to terminate at-will employees. 3 9 Such federal statutes have been
enacted for a variety of reasons: first, to promote unionization as a
countervailing force against oppressive employer power;40 second, to
31. 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down federal statute that barred common carriers from
dismissing employees for union membership). The United States Supreme Court found that "the
right of the employd to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the
right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6." Id. at
174-75.
32. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down Kansas statute forbidding "yellow dog" contracts that
required employees as a condition of employment to agree not to join a union).
33. Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-A Remedyfor the Abusively Discharged At Will Em-
ployee, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 563, 564 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Abusively DischargedAt Will
Employee].
34. Whistleblowing, supra note 12, at 783.
35. Id., citing Blades, supra note 5, at 1406.
36. Blades, supra note 5, at 1405.
37. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duly to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1827 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Protecting At Will
Employees].
38. Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5, at 491.
39. For a general discussion of various federal statutes which protect at-will employees from
wrongful discharges, see Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 37, at 1827-28. See also infra
notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
40. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 prohibits an employer from discriminating in
employment in order to encourage or discourage union membership. Wrongfully discharged em-
ployees can be, and normally are, ordered reinstated, and the employment relationship is thus
specifically enforced. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1974). "Simi-
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establish minimum wages and maximum hours;41 third, to prohibit dis-
crimination because of race, creed, nationality, sex and age;42 fourth, to
protect employee health and safety;43 and fifth, to establish retirement
benefits. 4 Although statutes prohibiting discrimination because of
race, creed, nationality, sex and age focus primarily on hiring, promo-
tion, and seniority practices, they have also been used to challenge dis-
missals in a wide variety of wrongful dismissal cases. Charges of
discrimination have been filed by male workers threatened with dis-
charge because they had long hair,45 or because they wore beards,4 6
and by female employees dismissed for objecting to sexual advances by
male supervisors, 47 gaining weight,48 getting married, 49 becoming preg-
lar statutes have been passed by fifteen states (Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin),. . . thereby extending this protection to a major portion of pri-
vate employment." Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5, at 492. For examples of federal
statutes which promote unionization as a safeguard against employer power and coercion, see
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188
(1976).
41. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). See generally W. MA-
LONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 545-639 (1974).
42. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) (pro-
hibits discriminatory discharge on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
Title VII does not, however, prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. Title VII is enforced
through civil suits brought either by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or by the
victimized employee. Other protections against retaliatory discharge include: Consumer Credit
Protection Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976) (prohibits discharge of employee whose wages
are garnished for an indebtedness); Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
(1976) (retaliatory discharge against those exercising rights under the Act is illegal); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976) (protects older workers from
discriminatory discharge); 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1976) (grants returning veterans right to return to
their former job without fear of being discharged for one year); Federal Automobile Dealer
Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964) (protects dealers from being wrongfully disen-
franchised by automobile manufacturers).
Many states also prohibit discharges for political activity. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102
(West 1971). Some states bar discharges because of physical handicap. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1402(a) (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ch. 363 (1976). A few states prohibit retalitory dis-
charges for filing workmen's compensation claims. See Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 651, 245 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1976); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1979);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980). The Texas statutory provisions prohibit
an employer from discharging an employee who files a workmen's compensation claim, hiring a
lawyer to represent him in a claim, or testifying in good faith at a proceeding under the Work-
men's Compensation Act.
43. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 1I(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976) (dis-
charge of those exercising rights under the Act prohibited); Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30
U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976).
44. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406 § 2, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in various sections of 5, 18, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
45. See, e.g., Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Thomas v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
46. Brown v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 10 FEP Cases 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Rafford v. Ran-
die Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
47. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
nant, 50 or refusing to shave their legs.5 I
In addition to federal legislation, a number of states have passed
laws forbidding employers from discharging an employee who exer-
cises his right to vote,52 engages in political activity or expresses a polit-
ical opinion, 53 serves as a juror,54 or refuses to take a lie detector test.55
These laws generally provide criminal penalties but no civil remedies,
with the result that employees seldom get their jobs back or recover
damages.5 6 However, some public employees, such as tenured school
teachers, have adequate protection against unjust dismissal because
they can only be dismissed after proof of incompetence or serious
misconduct.5 7
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL RULE
Within the last few years, many state courts have carved out an
exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine, holding that a termination
violating public policy provides a sufficient basis for a wrongful dis-
charge claim sounding in tort or contract.5 8 As one commentator ob-
48. Ashwarth v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Va. 1975). Michigan state law
prohibits height and weight discrimination. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102 (West Supp.
1982-1983).
49. Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975).
50. Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975).
51. Quist v. Plaza Restaurant, 2 [1981] EMPL. PRAc. REP. (CCH) 5388 (Conn. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 1975).
52. The Massachusetts statute, for example, provides:
No person shall, by threatening to discharge a person from his employment or to reduce
his wages, or by promising to give him employment at higher wages, attempt to influence
a voter to give or to withhold his vote, or, because of the giving or withholding of a vote,
discharge a person from his employment or reduce his wages.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). For a collection of state laws, see [1981] LAB. L.
REp. (CCH) (I State Laws) 43,045.
53. The California statute, for example, provides:
No employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees
through or by means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or
refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political action or
political activity.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971).
54. For a collection of state laws, see [1981] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (I State Laws) 43,035,
43,055.
55. For a collection of state laws, see [1981] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (I State Laws) 43,055.
56. E.g., Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (The court dismissed the
suit of an employee discharged for expressing his political opinions despite a statute expressly
prohibiting such discharges. The court held that the statute was "purely prohibitive in its charac-
ter, and . . . its violation cannot be satisfied with money.")
57. See J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 9-44 (1973); Jacobson,
Sperry & Jensen, The Dismissal and Non-Reemployment of Teachers, 1 J.L. & EDUC. 435 (1972);
Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-Some Proposals/or Change, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 526 (1974).
58. Olsen, supra note 7, at 268. Olsen notes that discharged workers have asserted numerous
theories of recovery to skirt the terminable-at-will doctrine. For example, many employees have
contended that their at-will employment contract was actually for a fixed period of time; or that
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served, "as a general exception to the rule. . . an employee may claim
damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing con-
travenes public policy."59 Furthermore, "while the public policies ini-
tially recognized by many of the courts arose out of statutes granting to
employees employment-related rights and imposing legal duties on em-
ployers, many courts recognized rather ethereal public policies not to
be found readily in legislation, constitutions, or judicial opinions." 60
Recognizing that many wrongfully terminated employees are not ade-
quately protected by specific federal or state laws, many jurisdictions
have permitted an abusively discharged plaintiff to proceed under
either a contract or tort theory of recovery where the discharge violates
public policy.
Contract Theory
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 39661
was the first decision to establish a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge on a contract theory. In this California case, the employee was
discharged for refusing to obey his employer's instructions to commit
perjury at a legislative hearing. Although the Petermann court recog-
nized that an employment contract which does not specify the term of
employment is terminable at the will of either party, the court also rec-
ognized that the right to discharge may be limited by statute or by con-
siderations of public policy. 62 The court characterized public policy as
"inherently not subject to precise definition," 63 but proceeded to hold
that the employer's behavior was contrary to public policy as reflected
their employment contract contained express or implied provisions that they would remain em-
ployed so long as they performed their job satisfactorily; or that they could only be discharged for
just cause; or that their discharge violated due process procedural safeguards; or that they detri-
mentally relied on their employer's oral promise of work for a reasonable period of time; or that
they gave their employer additional consideration beyond the mere performance of services. Id.
at 267-68. The public policy exception to the common law rule arose because these narrow theo-
ries of recovery have not provided the average American worker much protection from abusive
termination. For an excellent discussion of the various theories of recovery, see Hoekstra,
Palmateer: A Further Extension to Retaliatory Discharge in Illinois, 71 ILL. B.J. 298, 298-302
(1983).
59. Id. at 268, quoting Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330, 336, 563 P.2d
54, 57 (1977).
60. Id. at 268-69 (emphasis in original). In Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the court declared, without discussion, that strong state public policy favored the
protection of pension plans. See also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee wrongfully discharged for cooperating with law enforcement offi-
cials in a criminal investigation of a fellow employee where no statute expressly favored citizen
crime-fighters).
61. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
62. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The court cited no authority for its decision.
63. Id.
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in California's penal code which makes it a crime "to solicit the com-
mission of perjury. '64 Given that the state perjury laws reflected a
public policy encouraging truthful testimony, a failure to permit the
plaintiff's cause of action was viewed by the court as tantamount to
ignoring criminal conduct and defeating the interests of the state.65
The Petermann decision is also significant for the remedy which
the court fashioned. Basing its holding upon the employment contract
rather than the tort of retaliatory discharge, the court determined that
terminations which violate public policy constituted a breach of the
employment contract.66 The wrongfully discharged employee was enti-
tled to a civil remedy for damages but he did not have a right to be
reinstated.67 Although the criminal statute prohibiting perjury defined
a public policy which the employer breached, the statute was not in-
tended to provide a right or remedy to an employee who suffered dis-
charge for giving truthful testimony. The court thus created a public
policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule to "effectuate the state's
declared policy against perjury" 68 and to prevent the employer from
coercing his employee to break the law. The court acknowledged the
legislature's role in setting and defining public policy and perceived the
decision to be necessary to the proper effectuation of the legislative
mandate. 69 Using the public policy rationale of Petermann, subsequent
decisions have developed a protection for employees discharged in con-
travention of some independent statutory policy.70
Fifteen years after Petermann the New Hampshire Supreme Court
64. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(f) (West 1970).
65. Thus, the court stated:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and
sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the employ-
ment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee de-
clined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.
174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
66. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
67. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
68. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Montalvo v.
Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr., 401 (1970) (employer violated public policy favoring
collective bargaining and minimum wages by terminating employee who retained attorney to ne-
gotiate wages with his employer); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d
793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (employee discharged for union activity violates public policy as
codified by legislative enactment affording employees the protection of collective bargaining);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (discharge of employee for
filing workmen's compensation claim violated public policy); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (public policy violated where employee terminated for refusal to
perform catheterizations which were illegal for her to perform). See also Whistleblowing, supra
note 12, at 797-98.
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joined California in recognizing a contract action for retaliatory dis-
charge. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ,7 the court permitted the plain-
tiff to recover for lost wages for the period during which she was
deprived of employment. The defendant breached the oral contract of
employment by discharging the plaintiff in retaliation for the plaintiffs
refusals to comply with her foreman's requests for social companion-
ship. The court held that a discharge "which is motivated by bad faith
or malice or based on retaliation is not the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract. '72 The court offered neither a statutory nor a common law
basis for allowing recovery. 73 Instead, it rested its decision upon the
premise that society, as a whole, held an important interest in the em-
ployment relationship, an interest often at variance with the employer's
interest in operating a profitable and efficient business by exercising his
right to discharge an at-will employee. 74 By suggesting that public pol-
icy considerations can be used to prohibit all bad faith discharges
whether or not an independent statutory policy is explicitly violated,75
Monge departs from a long line of cases, stemming from Petermann,
which limit the employer's right to discharge in only those instances
where the discharge contravenes some independent statutory policy. 76
Other states have also permitted a cause of action based on a breach of
contract theory.
71. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See also Recent Decisions, 8 GA. L. REV. 996 (1974).
72. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
73. Id. The majority cites Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973), and Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), in support of its decision, but these two cases do not stand for the proposi-
tion that public policy without an accompanying statutory violation is sufficient by itself to modify
the terminable-at-will doctrine. See the remarks of Justice Grimes, 114 N.H. at 135-36, 316 A.2d
at 553 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
74. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
75. Monge effectively abolished the at-will rule on public policy grounds, and thus opened
the way for future courts to prohibit retaliatory discharges by judicial decisions which were not
necessarily based on expressly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979), rev'd, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (public
policy violated where doctor discharged because of a difference of medical opinion regarding drug
testing on human subjects); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981) (dicta that all that is required for tort of retaliatory discharge is that discharge be in
retaliation for the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of a clearly
mandated public policy); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977) (employer breached implied covenant of good faith in the employment contract by dis-
charging salesman to avoid paying him bonuses).
76. For examples of cases which have required a legislative expression of public policy to
cover the circumstances of the discharged at-will employee, see Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
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In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,77 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held in favor of an at-will employee dis-
charged by his employer who wished to avoid paying the plaintiff a
large bonus. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to con-
clude that the discharge was motivated by the defendant's desire to
minimize its commissions obligation and that an at-will employment
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and thus, the bad faith termination constituted a breach of contract.78
Tort Theory
A number of courts have recognized the tort of abusive or retalia-
tory discharge. For the plaintiff, the tort theory has many advantages
over the contract theory. In most contract cases, the plaintiff's recovery
is limited to wages lost during the time of absence from employment. 79
In addition to compensatory damages, 80 tort remedies permit the plain-
77. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
78. For an example of cases which have held that an at-will employment contract contains an
implied covenant of good faith and fairness, see Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553
F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976) (relying on Monge and applying New Hampshire law); McKinney v. Na-
tional Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (discharge of at-will employee, for rea-
sons relating to age, held to be a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (tort cause of action for at-will
employee discharged because his pension was about to vest); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64
F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974) (contract cause of action recognized for bad faith discharge); Smith v.
Frank R. Schoner Inc., 94 Ohio App. 308, 311-12, 115 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1953) (cause of action for
unlawful discharge recognized if employer discharged employee to avoid payment of commis-
sion).
The Fortune court's holding can be traced to a well-established rule that a principal cannot
deprive an agent of a commission by prematurely terminating the relationship. See Buysse v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1980); Rees v. Bank Bldg.
& Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964); Coleman v. Graybar Electric Co., 195 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1952). Cf. Lampley v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 359, 594 P.2d 605 (1979) (obliga-
tion to pay bonus under profit-sharing plan cannot be avoided by discharging employee before
distribution made); Sinnett v. Hie Food Prods., Inc., 185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720 (1970) (em-
ployee terminable at-will may be discharged 361 days after hire but, because terminated without
good cause, entitled to recover yearly stock bonus). Contra, Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127
(Mont. 1980) (summary judgment granted to defendant in case where plaintiff alleged that dis-
charge was motivated by desire to minimize commissions, because no public policy involved);
Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Wittler, 509 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (plaintiff not entitled to
recover bonus because bonus left to discretion of employer even though discharge occurred just
prior to payment). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 454 (1958); Olsen, supra
note 7, at 280.
79. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that damages attributable to mental suffering were not properly recoverable
in a breach of contract action. Recovery was limited to the loss of the computed "average pay" for
the period the employee was discharged.
80. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162,
413 A.2d 960 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank
in Fairmount, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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tiff to recover punitive damages8' as well as damages for mental
anguish, pain and suffering.8 2
In 1973, the Indiana Supreme Court became the first jurisdiction
to recognize a tort action for retaliatory discharge in a workmen's com-
pensation context. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. 83 involved an
employee who was allegedly discharged in retaliation for filing a work-
men's compensation claim. The court maintained that "when an em-
ployee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right
an exception to the general [terminable-at-will] rule must be recog-
nized."'8 4 The statutory right which the court relied on was the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act which prohibits employers from using
any "other device" to escape liaiblity for workmen's compensation
claims.85 Although the Act did not provide for a private right of action
for its breach, the court read "other device" broadly so as to include
retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff was thus held to have a private
cause of action, "in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for
public policy to be effectuated. '8 6 The court did not award any dam-
ages to the plaintiff, but instead remanded the case to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
In 1976, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the identical
issue raised in Frampton: whether a private cause of action should be
permitted for an at-will employee who is discharged in retaliation for
filing a workmen's compensation claim. The appellate court, in
Sventko v. Kroger Co. ,87 acknowledged that the Michigan Workmen's
81. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the employer for wrongfully discharging
his employee. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610
P.2d 1330 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). Contra, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974).
83. 360 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
84. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
85. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns 1974):
[N]o contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule regulation or other device shall,
in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation
created by this act.
86. 260 Ind. at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427. See also Whistleblowing, supra note 12, at 789.
Frampton has been followed in Texas in the case of Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d
I1l (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), but limited as to remedy permitted. See Smith v. Coffee's Shop for
Boys & Men, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (no right exists to force an employer to
rehire an employee discharged for filing a workmen's compensation claim).
Louisiana distinguished Frampton in Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So.2d 510 (La.
Ct. of App. 1974), on the basis that, where the employee had filed for workmen's compensation
benefits nine months before his discharge, the court held there was no evidence that the discharge
was in retaliation for filing the claim.
87. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
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Compensation Act8 8 did not expressly provide for a private remedy for
the statute's breach. Following Frampton, however, the Sventko court
held that an employer is not free to discharge an employee when to do
so would contravene public policy.89 The court stated that the work-
men's compensation act manifested a clear expression of public policy.
The concurring opinion noted that the legislative policy of providing
financial benefits to victims of work-related injuries could best be effec-
tuated by allowing a tort action for retaliatory discharge.90
The Frampton and Sventko decisions stand for the proposition
that a tort action for retaliatory discharge will lie where an employer,
by use of the discharge power, acts to thwart a clear statutory expres-
sion of public policy which has conferred rights upon the employee and
that granting the relief sought will further the intent of the legislature.9'
One year after Sventko, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Loucks v. Star City Glass Co. 92 declined to follow
the trend established by Sventko and Frampton. The Loucks court
held that Illinois workmen's compensation law did not permit a cause
of action against an employer who discharged an employee in retalia-
tion for filing a workmen's compensation claim because the Illinois leg-
islature did not provide for a prohibition against retaliatory discharge
in a workmen's compensation context. 93 The court concluded that the
legislature, not the courts, should decide whether to extend the Work-
men's Compensation Act. 94
Illinois Adopts the Tort of Retaliatory Discharge:
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
In December 1978, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,9 5 the Illinois
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.101-941 (1976).
89. "[An at will employer is not free to discharge an employee when the reason for the
discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state."
69 Mich. App. at 647, 245 N.W.2d at 153.
90. Id. at 651, 245 N.W.2d at 155 (Callen, J., concurring). The dissent strongly objected to
such "judicial legislation." Id. at 653, 245 N.W.2d at 158 (Danhof, J., dissenting). The dissent
would require "express legislative authority" before limiting the at-win rule.
91. See Whistleblowing, supra note 12, at 791. At least three other jurisdictions have followed
Frampton and Sventko in recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in a workmen's
compensation context; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Brown v.
Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597, 346 A.2d 1087 (1978); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d Ill
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
92. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 748.
94. Id. at 749.
95. 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist. 1977), rev'd, 74 111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d
353 (1978). For a discussion of Kelsay, see TheAbusively DischargedAt Will Employee, supra note
33; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-Illinois Courts Welcome Retaliatory Discharge Suits Under the
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Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether Illinois should rec-
ognize a cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge. Con-
fronted with a particularly harsh application of the terminable-at-will
rule, 96 the court held that the retaliatory discharge of an employee for
pursuing a workmen's compensation claim offended the public policy
of Illinois97 as manifested in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act. 98 Justice Ryan, writing for the majority, rejected Loucks as con-
trolling precedent, noting that federal court decisions construing state
law do not bind state courts.99 Furthermore, the court disagreed with
the Loucks result, stating that "an employer's otherwise absolute power
to terminate an employee at will should [not] prevail when that power
is exercised to prevent the employee from asserting his statutory rights
under the Workmen's Compensation Act".'°° Although the legislature
had not provided a civil remedy for the plaintiffs discharge, the court
held that the termination-if allowed to stand-would contravene es-
tablished public policy. I0 The court concluded that such an "abusive
discharge" gave rise to a cause of action in tort for compensatory and,
in future cases, punitive damages. 02
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839 (1980). See also infra text accompanying
notes 96-102.
96. "In [Illinois] the rule has long been established that a hiring at a monthly or annual
salary, if no duration is specified in the contract, is presumed to be at will and either party may
terminate the hiring at his pleasure without liability." Long v. Arthur Rubloff & Co., 27 II. App.
3d 1013, 1023, 327 N.E.2d 346, 353 (1975). See, e.g., Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. v. Jones,
51 111. App. 3d 182, 367 N.E.2d 111 (1977); Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1977); Brian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970); Roemer v. Zurich Insurance Co.,
25 I11. App. 3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1975); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 161
N.E.2d 355 (1959); Note, Tort Remedyfor Retaliatory Discharge: Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act Limits Employer's Power to Discharge Employees Terminable At- Will, Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 561, 561-3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tort Remedy for Retaliatory
Discharge]; The Abusiely Discharged At Will Employee, supra note 33; Recent Decision, 68 ILL.
B.J. 287 (1979).
97. 74 Ill. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1-138.28 (1979), as amended by P.A. 81-992 § 17 (1980).
99. 74 111. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
100. Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
101. Id. at 184, 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59. The plaintiff was terminated by Motorola prior to
the enactment of an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act making it unlawful for an
employer to interfere with or coerce the employee in the exercise of his rights under the Act. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1975).
102. 74 111. 2d at 189-90, 384 N.E.2d at 361. The Kelsay court affirmed a directed verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $749 in compensatory damages but reversed the trial court's order for
$25,000 in punitive damages. The court held that punitive damages could not be awarded in the
present case because this
would be permitting the jury to punish the defendants for conduct which they could not
have determined beforehand was ever actionable. The assessment of punitive damages
has some of the same functions as the sanctions of criminal law. The sanctions of the
criminal law cannot constitutionally be imposed when the criminality of the conduct is
not capable of being known beforehand.
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The Parameters of the Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception to the termination-at-will doctrine has
received widest acceptance where there has been some clearly ex-
pressed legislative mandate of public policy. Thus, actions for retalia-
tory discharge have been allowed where the employee was terminated
for refusing to commit a criminal act, 103 refusing to violate a consumer
credit code,'0 4 refusing to perform cathetherizations which were illegal
for the employee to perform, 105 engaging in union activity, 06 and tak-
ing time off from work to serve on a jury. 0 7 Other cases have rejected
the public policy exception despite strong public policy overtones ar-
ticulated by the legislature. For example, employees had no cause of
action in tort when discharged for refusing to falsify medical records, 108
exercising a statutory right to examine corporate books, 0 9 and oppos-
ing an employer's discriminatory employment practices in not hiring
women." i0 Some courts have refused to grant a cause of action for
breach of the employment contract where the employer's motive for
firing did not infringe upon clearly established public policy,"' while
other courts have denied recovery where the activity which lead to the
discharge was the private concern of the employee. ' 2 A few courts
have been reluctant to permit a cause of action for the tort of retalia-
tory discharge where there was no clear violation of public policy,' '3 or
where public policy was held to be too vague a concept to justify the
creation of a new tort,' "4 or where purely private interests were at
Id. at 188, 384 N.E.2d at 359, quoting, Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220-21, 536 P.2d 512, 517
(1975) (citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980) (for refusing to engage in price-fixing scheme which violated express provisions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. § 1)).
104. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
105. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
106. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1961).
107. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
108. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977). The Alabama court refused
to grant relief to the discharged employee on the following grounds: the employment contract was
at-will, the fear of overruling existing Alabama law, and the public policy argument was too nebu-
lous a standard.
109. Campbell v. Ford Indust., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
110. McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
111. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 508, 573 P.2d 907, 909 (1977); Jackson v.
Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 334, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (1977); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d
127, 129 (Mont. 1980).
112. Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 822, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531, 534
(1974); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky. App. 1977).
113. Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 1979); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc.,
270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 526, 563-64; 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979).
114. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977).
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stake. ''5
Before applying the public policy exception most courts require
the plaintiff to show more than a mere personal interest." 6 The em-
ployer's actions must harm not only the plaintiff but also society as
well, usually by circumventing a specific statutory pronouncement.
1 7
A purely private interest that has not ripened into a societal interest is
normally fatal to a cause of action."18
The tort theory of recovery provides greater monetary relief from
unjust dismissal than does the contract theory."19 Tort liability attaches
in cases of abusive discharge based upon the employer's malicious mo-
tives.' 20 Tort law restricts the employer's right to terminate in situa-
tions where the employee is not protected by an oral or written contract
specifically providing for job security. Some courts have indicated a
preference for the public policy exception rather than imply a contrac-
tual covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relation
as a means of limiting management's prerogative.'21 The major advan-
tage of the tort theory is the possibility of recovering punitive damages
115. Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
116. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 216-18, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (1975).
117. Id See generally, Whistleblo wing, supra note 12, at 796.
118. See, e.g., Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977) (attending night
law school); Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974)
(refusal to terminate suit against employer).
119. Blades, supra note 5, at 1421-22.
120. Id. at 1422-23.
121. Illinois accepts the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule where an em-
ployee exercises statutory rights. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978)
(employee stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge where plaintiff alleged her termination
was motivated by her filing a worker's compensation claim against her employer; the Illinois
Supreme Court held employers could be sued by employees for punitive damages when averting
statutory rights). The Illinois Supreme Court extended the public policy exception in Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (where an employee was termi-
nated for "whistleblowing" to a local law enforcement agency accusing a fellow employee of crim-
inal activity and for volunteering to testify against the employee, an action may lie for the tort of
retaliatory discharge). The Illinois Appellate Court rejected reading a "just cause" limitation into
the employment contract. Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91
(1978) (court refused to follow employee's contention that there exists in all employment agree-
ments the limitation of "just cause" absent explicit language so providing). The Illinois Appellate
Court refused to limit management's prerogative by statements contained in employee handbooks.
Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979). The court
rejected the employee's argument that guidelines set forth in a personnel manual constituted terms
of a contract to which the employer was bound. Id. at 121, 397 N.E.2d at 445.
Indiana recognizes the public policy exception for statutorily conferred personal rights.
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (recognizes that the
discharge of an employee for filing a workmen's compensation claim was in violation of public
policy). Indiana rejects the notion that a company handbook limits an employer's prerogative to
discharge. Shaw v. S. S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975). The court refused to
accept the employee's contention that an employee's handbook sets out conditions of employment,
or constitutes a part of a contract of employment.
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as well as damages for emotional harm which are not generally avail-
able in contract actions. 122 On the other hand, the contract theory pro-
hibits discharges made in bad faith 23 or without just cause. 124
Unfortunately, many courts have failed to identify the actual bases for
their decisions, leaving employers to speculate whether they breached
an implied contract or commited a tort.125
The scope and meaning of the public policy exception to the at-
will rule has been, and continues to be, a confusing and inconsistent
area of the law. In this regard, a myriad of conflicting decisions under
both the contract and tort theories of recovery will provide little if any
precedential value to any individual discharge case. Confusion over
the validity of the development and scope of the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will rule has led more than one court to conclude that the
conflicts over the creation of the cause of action for wrongful discharge
and its limitations should be resolved by the legislative process.' 26 In
Palmateer the Illinois Supreme Court has further muddied an already
murky area of the law.
PALMATEER V INERNATIONAL HARVESTER Co.
Facts of the Case
In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. ,127 Ray Palmateer al-
leged that he had suffered a retaliatory discharge by his employer, In-
ternational Harvester Company, for "blowing the whistle" on a co-
122. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (punitive dam-
ages may properly be awarded prospectively in retaliatory discharge cases); Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (plaintiff was discharged fourteen
months before the filing of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Kelsay, and therefore, punitive
damages would be allowed only in future cases); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355
N.E.2d 315 (1976) (emotional harm).
123. See notes 71-78 supra and accompanying text.
124. "Just or good cause is some substantial misbehavior on the part of the employee which is
recognized as good grounds for dismissal both at law and by sound public opinion." Contractual
Right of Discharge, supra note 1, at 714-15; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (a promise to discharge only for cause may be incorporated
into the employment contract either by express oral or written agreement or based upon an em-
ployee's legitimate expectations grounded in the employer's manual and the promise is enforce-
able even though no mutual intention to create contract rights in the employee existed).
125. See, e.g., McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Ry., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Geary v.
United States Steel Corp. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
126. See, e.g., Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See generally,
Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5.
127. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). Justice Simon authored the opinion; Justice Under-
wood dissented and Justices Ryan and Moran filed a separate dissent.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
employee who might have committed a crime. Palmateer claimed he
was dismissed for having supplied information to local law-enforce-
ment officials that an employee might be involved in a violation of the
Illinois Criminal Code of 1961128 and for having agreed to cooperate in
the investigation and trial of the employee if requested. 129 The em-
ployee's crime was never specifically stated in the record. The circuit
court of Rock Island County dismissed the complaint 30 for failure to
state a cause of action and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the
dismissal in a divided opinion. 13' While recognizing an exception to
the terminable-at-will rule for an employer who terminates an em-
ployee in derogation of "a contract provision, a statute, or public pol-
icy,"'132 the appellate court concluded that there was insufficient Illinois
precedent in which an employee had been discharged for participating
in the uncovering of criminal wrongdoing. 33 Thus, in the absence of
legislative or judicial authority for expanding the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge, the court held that "the parties had an employment contract at-
will." 134
Writing in dissent in the appellate court decision, Justice Barry
found substantial statutory authority for the proposition that it is con-
trary to the expressly stated public policy of Illinois for an employer to
threaten to discharge an employee in order to prevent the employee
from cooperating with the police in the enforcement of the Illinois
Criminal Code. 35
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1979).
129. 85 Ill. 2d at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
130. In addition to a claim for wrongful discharge, Palmateer also requested compensatory
and punitive damages for breach of contract, violation of his constitutional and civil rights, and
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. The trial judge entered judgment for Interna-
tional Harvester on all counts. Palmateer appealed to the appellate court from the wrongful dis-
charge and intentional infliction of emotional distress judgment.
131. 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (1980).
132. Id. at 52, 406 N.E.2d at 597.
133. Id. Writing for the majority Justice Stouder did not examine the various provisions of
the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 which, according to Justice Barry in his dissent, made Interna-
tional Harvester's conduct violative of public policy. For a detailed analysis of the specific code
sections, see note 135, infra.
134. 85 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 406 N.E.2d at 597.
135. Id. at 57, 406 N.E.2d at 601. (Barry, J., dissenting). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 31-4, 31-8,
32-1, 32-4 (1977) (these code sections proscribe, respectively, obstruction of justice, refusing to aid
a police officer, interfering with jurors or witnesses called to testify, and compounding a crime).
The dissent cited People v. Vitucci, 49 Ill. App. 2d 171, 199 N.E.2d 78 (1964) (employer held in
contempt for discharging an employee who exercises his civil rights of serving on a jury) and
People v. Huggins, 258 Ill. App. 238 (1930) (making it a contempt of court to fire or discipline an
employee for attending court when subpoenaed as a witness) for examples of case law which
prohibit activity of essentially the same character as that complained of by the plaintiff, Palmateer.
Justice Barry's dissent became, in slightly modified form, the position of the majority in the
Illinois Supreme Court's reversal of the appellate court's dismissal. 85 Ill. App. 3d at 58, 406
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The Illinois Supreme Court granted Palmateer leave to appeal.
The court addressed the issue of whether a private right of action for
the tort of retaliatory discharge should be permitted an at-will em-
ployee discharged for providing information to the police regarding a
possible criminal violation by a fellow employee and agreeing to testify
if requested to do so. 136 Relying on Kelsay, the supreme court reversed
the judgment granting dismissal of Palmateer's complaint by the appel-
late and circuit courts with regard to the discharge claim and remanded
the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 37 In a four to
three decision, the supreme court held that Palmateer had stated a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 38 The court concluded that a
complaint shall not be dismissed where the plaintiff alleges that the
employer discharged the employee in retaliation for the employee's ac-
tivities, and that the discharge contravened clearly mandated public
policy. 139
The supreme court disposed of the prayer for punitive damages in
the same manner as in Kelsay, 40 holding that punitive damages would
only be allowed in future cases.' 4' Consistent with the holding in Kel-
say, the court disallowed an award of punitive damages because
Palmateer had been discharged fourteen months before the Kelsay
opinion was filed.' 42
Reasoning of the Majority Opinion
The main concern facing the Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer
was not whether the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will
rule should be recognized-Kelsay 143 had already firmly established its
existence. The issue was rather how explicitly must the legislature have
articulated the public policy before an employee could maintain a pri-
vate cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Despite language in the
Workmen's Compensation Act suggesting that the Illinois General As-
N.E.2d at 601 (Barry, J., dissenting). Both Justice Barry and the majority of the supreme court
found a clear mandate by the Illinois legislature certifying that the public policy of Illinois is to
encourage employees to disclose evidence of criminal activity and to encourage people with infor-
mation to cooperate with the authorities. In light of this public policy, the tort of retaliatory
discharge is actionable. 85 I11. 2d at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
136. Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
137. Id. at 135, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
138. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
139. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
140. Id. at 134-35, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
141. For a discussion of the award of punitive damages in Kelsay, see supra text accompany-
ing note 102.
142. 85 Ill. 2d at 134-35, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
143. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IUI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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sembly had made a conscious decision to deny a civil remedy, 144 the
Kelsay court determined that the public policy, as stated in the Act,
"could only be effectively implemented and enforced by allowing a
civil remedy for damages."' 145 According to Palmateer, the Kelsay
court noted that "public policy strongly favored the exercise of
worker's compensation rights; if employees could be fired for filing
compensation claims, that public policy would be frustrated."' 146 The
majority in Palmateer reaffirmed the Kelsay decision which limited an
employer's otherwise absolute power to discharge an at-will employee
where the discharge contravenes the public policy of the Act. 147
The broad issue before the supreme court in Kelsay arose again in
Palmateer: whether a court may provide relief to at-will workers who
are discharged in violation of public policy where the cause of action is
not expressly stated in a statute or clearly sanctioned in the legislative
history. Despite the legislature's failure to grant outright approval in
either case, the supreme court fashioned a remedy based on public pol-
icy considerations, which effectively implemented the legislative intent.
In view of the fact that the legislature had not expressly provided relief
for a wrongfully discharged employee, the supreme court examined the
public policy behind the two statutes. Even in the absence of an ex-
plicit legislative proscription against retaliatory discharge, the supreme
court concluded that public policy nevertheless favors permitting em-
ployees to file workmen's compensation claims under the Act 148 or to
participate actively in criminal investigations. 149
The Palmateer court, however, refused to limit the tort of retalia-
tory discharge to a workmen's compensation context, 150 and extended
144. The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act was intended by the legislature to be the ex-
clusive remedy available to employees for job-related injuries. The Act specifically provides:
"The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure
of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated
in Section 3 of this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.11 (1973). The employer in Kelsay also
argued that the legislature's decision to provide solely for criminal punishment of employers who,
after 1975, "discharge or... threaten to discharge. . . an employee because of the exercise of his
rights or remedies granted to him by [the] Act," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1975), without
providing for a civil remedy for employees who are so discharged, precluded the plaintiff's action.
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978). The Kelsay court refused
to accept the employer's argument and held that "to uphold and implement [the] public policy [of
the Act] a cause of action should exist for retaliatory discharge." Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
145. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
146. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 127-28, 421 N.E.2d 876, 877
(1981).
147. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
148. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
149. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IUI. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
150. The Kelsay majority carefully limited its decision to the workmen's compensation issue
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its application to any situation where "a discharge contravenes public
policy."15' Henceforth, after Palmateer, an employer's freedom to dis-
miss an employee may be circumscribed where public policy would be
contravened by permitting the retaliatory firing. 152
Having concluded that Kelsay supported the public policy excep-
tion, 53 the supreme court turned its attention to "what constitutes
clearly mandated public policy."'154 The court said that although pub-
lic policy is not subject to precise definition,' 55 it may be found "in the
State's constitution and statutes, and, when these are silent, in its judi-
cial decisions."' 56 Public policy is a matter which strikes "at the heart
of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities."1 57 In place of a
precise definition, the majority cited numerous examples from other
jurisdictions which permitted a cause of action where the employee was
discharged for refusing to violate a statute, 58 or for engaging in statu-
torily protected union activities. 159 The court observed that the cause
of action has been denied where it is clear that only private interests are
at stake.' 60 According to the court, no consistent answer for restricting
the employer's right to terminate has emerged where the nature of the
interest is partly public and partly private.' 6 1
The most critical aspect of the court's holding was its conclusion
that public policy "favors citizen crime-fighters."'' 62 Although no spe-
cific statutory provision in the Illinois Criminal Code 163 creates a
presented and refrained from announcing a broad public policy exception to govern disputes in
other situations. 74 IlL. 2d at 183-85, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
151. 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
152. The majority concluded: "In addition, unchecked employer power, like unchecked em-
ployee power, has been seen to present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered
and adopted by society as a whole." Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
153. The majority stated: "The [Kelsay] court noted that public policy strongly favored the
exercise of worker's compensation rights." Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
154. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
155. Id. See also Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 187, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959); Job Security, supra note 10, at 340-44.
156. 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878, quoting, Smith v. Board of Education, 405 I11. 143,
147, 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1950). The dissent pointed out that many Illinois cases make no mention
of the role of judicial decisions in formulating public policy and that the question of public policy
is first and foremost a matter of legislative concern. 85 I11. 2d at 137, 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
157. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
158. Id. at 130-31, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
159. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1961). See supra text accompanying note 106.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
161. 85 Ill. 2d at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
162. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
163. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1979).
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mandatory duty to search out and prosecute criminal activity, 164 the
court reasoned that public policy, nonetheless, "favors the exposure of
crime."' 165 The court stressed that the most basic of all public policies is
the enforcement of the state's criminal laws. 166 The effective imple-
mentation of these laws demands that citizens be encouraged to volun-
teer information to law enforcement officials and to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the suspected crime. 167 Thus, "[oince
the possibility of crime was reported, Palmateer was under a statutory
duty to assist in the investigation when requested to do so by local au-
thorities."' 168 In response to International Harvester's contention that it
should be free to discharge an employee for recklessly resorting to the
criminal justice system, the court answered that public policy had de-
termined that the problem should be resolved through the criminal jus-
tice system.' 69 An employee must be free to "blow the whistle" on a
fellow employee who may have violated the Criminal Code, regardless
of the magnitude of the crime. 70 By bringing such criminal activity to
light, the whistle-blowing employee acts in the public's best interest. In
summary, the court concluded that the criminal laws were enacted not
only to punish unlawful activity, but also to encourage behavior which
aids in the enforcement of these laws. 7 ' Having determined that such
behavior is beneficial to society as a whole, the court held that
Palmateer's conduct fell within the public policy exception to the termi-
nable-at-will rule.
Finally, the court addressed International Harvester's position that
the complaint was defective because Palmateer refrained from identify-
164. Writing for the majority, Justice Simon stated: "No specific constitutional or statutory
provision requires a citizen to take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but
public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters." 85 Ill. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
165. Id., quoting, Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 44, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231
(1980).
166. 85 Ill. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
167. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880. Palmateer's counsel argued:
While governments are instituted to secure the rights of the people and to protect prop-
erty, the people must recognize their corresponding individual obligations and responsi-
bilities. The duty to provide information concerning violations of the law to the police is
as fundamental a responsiblity as that to obey the law, for unless the former obligation is
encouraged those who fail to observe the latter would never be brought to justice. Sup-
pression of evidence and interference with witnesses constitute dangerous threats to the
safety and welfare of the people and the orderly process of government and have, there-
fore, been the subject of strict criminal sanctions. Cooperation with peace officers is
required.
Brief for Palmateer at 7, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 InI. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (citations omitted).
168. Id. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-8 (1979).
169. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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ing his fellow employee and failed to set forth the precise crime which
was the focus of the investigation. Instead of moving for a more defi-
nite statement, 72 International Harvester moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. Granting that the complaint
was not as specific as it should have been, the court found that the
complaint nonetheless reasonably informed the employer of the nature
of the claim and stated a cause of action. 173
Reasoning of the Dissents
In his tersely worded dissent, Justice Underwood reiterated his
reasons for dissenting in Kelsay. He criticized the majority for its judi-
cial activism in an area where the principle of separation of powers
requires that only the legislature may proclaim declarations of public
policy. 174
In a separate dissent, Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Moran,
strongly disagreed with the majority's decision and advanced his own
reasons for denying relief to Palmateer: first, that the public policy
against retaliatory discharge must be clearly defined; second, the legis-
lature has not sought to articulate any public policy favoring citizen
crime-fighters; and third, that the decision will contribute to the already
declining business climate in Illinois. 75
Ryan insisted that most of the jurisdictions that have allowed a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge have required that the public
policy against such discharge be "clearly articulated, strong, fundamen-
tal, compelling and well-defined."'' 76 To support his conclusion, he ar-
gued that courts are generally unwilling to create a cause of action for a
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(1) (1979).
173. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
174. Id. at 135-36, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Underwood, J., dissenting). See also Kelsay v. Motor-
ola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 190-91, 384 N.E.2d 353, 361-62 (1978) (Underwood, J., concurring and
dissenting); ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1970). Section 1 provides: "The legislative, executive and
judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
Id.
175. 85 Ill. 2d at 136-45, 421 N.E.2d at 881-86.
176. Id. at 141, 421 N.E.2d at 883. Justice Ryan wrote: "Only in cases where there have been
clearly articulated, strong, fundamental, compelling and well-defined policies can a discharge
which contravened these policies give rise to a tort action for retaliatory discharge." Id. (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). See also Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd,
539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (clear mandate of public policy); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270
N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (clearly violative of public policy); Campbell v. Ford Industries, Inc., 274
Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976) (strong public policy); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa.
171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (clear mandate of public policy); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d
581 (1979) (clear and compelling public policy); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978) (substantial public policy). Contra, Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Team-
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discharged employee "simply because his conduct was praiseworthy or
because the public may have derived some benefit from it.'177 Accord-
ing to Justice Ryan, the clear articulation of such a strong public policy
is almost always "found in legislative pronouncement." 178 By conclud-
ing that public policy favors citizen crime-fighters, the dissent stated
that the majority usurped the function of the legislative branch of gov-
ernment whose proper function is to establish public policy.'
79
Justice Ryan pointed out that most courts have required a nexus
between a violation of some legislatively expressed public policy and
the motivation for the discharge before the at-will doctrine can be ig-
nored.180 Ryan cautioned against abandoning the general rule that an
at-will employment is terminable at the discretion of the employer, ex-
cept in instances where the wrongful discharge is based on statutes
which are specifically designed to protect the rights of the employee.' 8 '
Adoption of public policy parameters extending beyond those clearly
expressed by the legislature in a statute is an action perilously close to
sters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (public policy favors that which has a
tendency to be beneficial to the public welfare).
Justice Ryan distinguished Monge and Fortune from the strong-public-policy line of cases on
the basis that these two cases sought a contract remedy rather than a tort remedy. See supra text
accompanying notes 71-78.
177. 85 Ill. 2d at 139, 421 N.E.2d at 883 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan observed that in
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), the employer had the right
to discharge an employee who objected to the safety of a product even though his intentions were
praiseworthy. Justice Ryan also cited Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa
1978), for the proposition that courts will not permit a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
where the public benefit is small relative to the employer's right to control the direction of his
business. Furthermore, Justice Ryan discussed Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.
App. 1977), where the plaintiff had been discharged after he announced his plans to attend night
law school. The Kraftco court refused to afford relief to the plaintiff in the absence of clearly
established legislative policy.
178. 85 11. 2d at 141, 421 N.E.2d at 883 (Ryan, J., dissenting). See J. SUTHERLAND, STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION, § 55.01 (4th ed. 1973). See generally, R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-12 (1975); Whistleblowing, supra note 12, at 793.
179. 85 Ill. 2d at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 141-43, 421 N.E.2d at 883-84.
181. Id. at 140, 421 N.E.2d at 883. Justice Ryan analyzed two California cases which upheld
the validity of the at-will doctrine where there was no articulated public policy through legislative
action. In Becket v. Welton Becket & Associates, 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974),
the employee, as an executor of the estate, was discharged for refusing to terminate a lawsuit
against his employer. The court denied relief because the public policy had not been expressed by
either a criminal statute or a statute designed to protect the rights of the employee. In Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. App. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), the Supreme
Court of California held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a wrongful discharge tort claim.
The employee contended that he was fired after fifteen years of satisfactory job performance be-
cause he refused to take part in alleged price-fixing violations prohibited by the Sherman Act and
the California Cartwright Act. The court acknowledged that employees may maintain actions for
retaliatory discharge where the legislature has "articulated a fundamental public policy which the
employer's discharge clearly contravened." Id. at 177, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845, 610 P.2d at 1336.
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judicial legislation.182 Justice Ryan distinguished the cases permitting
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on bad faith 83 from
the strong-public policy line of cases on the basis that the former al-
lowed recovery for breach of contract rather than for a tort, and puni-
tive damages were not sought. 184 In the dissent's view, the majority
mistakenly created its own "vague concept of public policy" which was
never articulated by the legislature. 85  Justice Ryan stated that
Palmateer was not entitled to recover compensatory and punitive dam-
ages because his complaint did not allege conduct on his part that
would "bring it within the area of any public policy that has been ar-
ticulated by the legislature." 8 6 Palmateer only alleged that he was dis-
charged for reporting to the authorities that an employee might have
committed a crime and that he agreed to assist in the investigation; "the
complaint [did] not even allege that a crime had been committed."' 187
Justice Ryan noted that the legislature has declared "obstruction-of-
justice"188 and "refusing to aid a police officer"'189 to be crimes; how-
ever, the legislature has not sought to articulate any public policy
favoring citizen crime-fighters. Because Palmateer was not discharged
for failing to violate the requirements of the Illinois Criminal Code, his
conduct did not fall within any legislative pronouncement which is the
source of the public policy exception. His conduct fell substantially
below the clear, well-defined public policy requirement which Justice
Ryan argued is essential for an actionable tort. 190
Justice Ryan also expressed concern over the "deteriorating busi-
ness climate" in Illinois and predicted that the vague concept of public
policy endorsed by the majority would force many industries to leave
the state.' 91 In summary the dissent stated that to maintain a better
balance between the interests of employer and employee, 92 the tort of
retaliatory discharge should be allowed only where the discharge vio-
lated a strong public policy which has been clearly articulated, nor-
182. 85 Ill. 2d at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
184. 85 I11. 2d at 141, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
185. Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 886.
186. Id. at 141, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
187. Id. at 142, 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-4 (1979).
189. Id. § 31-8.
190. 85 Ill. 2d at 141-42, 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
192. Justice Ryan cautioned against allowing the pendulum to swing too far in favor of the
employee. In developing this new tort, courts "must balance the interests of employee and em-
ployer" so the expectations of both can be best accommodated. Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 884
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
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mally by the legislature. 93 In the process of emerging from the
harshness of the traditional rule, the pendulum has begun to swing to
the opposite extreme in favor of an employee's right to permanent em-
ployment. 94 According to the dissent, courts must balance the inter-
ests of employee and employer with the "hope of fashioning a remedy
that will accommodate the legitimate expectations of both."'' 95
ANALYSIS
The Majority's Reliance on the Illinois Criminal Code
The majority determined that the employment at-will rule is not
absolute. An employer at-will is not free to discharge an employee
when the reason for the discharge has the effect of contravening the
public policy of Illinois. Expressions of public policy are generally
found in the state's "constitution and statutes and, when they are silent,
in its judicial decisions."' 96 The majority declared that the enforce-
ment of a state's criminal code is the cornerstone of ordered liberty. 197
The court recognized that the Illinois Criminal Code does not require
citizens to take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of
crime. Nonetheless, public policy, as expressed in the Illinois criminal
statutes, favors citizen crime-fighters.1 98
Relying apparently on two sections of the Illinois Criminal Code,
the majority concluded that public policy "favors Palmateer's conduct
in volunteering information to the law-enforcement agency."' 99 The
obstruction-of-justice statute200 makes it unlawful to conceal a crime.
The majority interprets this statute very broadly as conferring a right
and placing an affirmative duty upon an employee to report possible
criminal activity to the police. The court maintained that an employee
193. Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 885-86 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878, citing, Smith v. Board of Education, 405 I11. 143, 147, 89
N.E.2d 893, 896 (1950).
197. 85 Ill. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879, citing, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937);
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 61-62, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 I11. 2d 337, 345,
400 N.E.2d 421 (1979).
198. The Palmateer majority quoted from Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 I11. 2d 40, 44,
411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1980), a case involving actions for malicious prosecution but analogous to
the citizen employee who fears discharge:
Public policy favors the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing
knowledge thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy. Persons acting
in good faith who have probable cause to believe crimes have been committed should
not be deterred from reporting them by the fear of unfounded suits by those accused.
85 Ill. 2d at 132-33, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
199. 85 I11. 2d at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
200. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-4 (1979). The obstructing justice statute provides:
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has the right under the obstructing justice statute to assume the role of
a citizen crime-fighter undertaking to ferret out crime for law-enforce-
ment authorities. However, the dissent correctly points out that
Palmateer was not discharged for failing to violate or for complying
with the requirements of this statute. 201
The second section of the criminal code referred to in the majority
opinion concerns refusal to aid an officer. 202 According to the majority,
once a crime has been reported an employee has a statutory duty to
assist officials when requested to do so. As the dissent points out, the
majority construes the refusal-to-aid-an-officer statute as placing an ob-
ligation on an employee to become involved in fighting crime. Public
policy, as articulated by the legislature in the criminal code, "also fa-
vors Palmateer's agreement to assist in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the suspected crime. ' 203 These two sections of the Illinois
Criminal Code, taken together, comprise a clear expression of public
policy warranting the abrogation of the common law concept of termi-
nation at-will. Unwilling to depart from the strictures laid down in
Kelsay, the court sought the legitimacy of legislative action. Legisla-
tion remains the strongest indicator of the existence of public policy.
The statutory right involved in Palmateer was the Illinois Criminal
Code which depends for its enforcement upon the voluntary coopera-
tion of private citizens.
The majority overlooked a recently enacted section of the criminal
code which expressly forbids an employer from discharging or termi-
nating an employee for attending criminal proceedings. This statute
provides that no employer shall discharge or threaten to discharge any
employee who is a witness to a crime for time lost from regular em-
A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the
prosecution or defense of any person, he knowingly commits any of the following acts:
(a) Destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants false evidence,
furnishes false information; or
(b) Induces a witness having knowledge material to the subject at issue to leave the
State or conceal himself, or
(c) Possessing knowledge material to the subject at issue, he leaves the State or con-
ceals himself.
(d) Sentence.
Obstructing justice is a Class 4 felony.
Id.
201. 85 Il. 2d at 141, 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
202. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-8 (1979). The statute provides:
Whoever upon command refuses or knowingly fails reasonably to aid a person
known by him to be a peace officer in:
(a) Apprehending a person whom the officer is authorized to apprehend; or(b) Preventing the commission by another of any offense, commits a petty offense.
Id.
203. 85 Ill. 2d at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
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ployment while attending criminal proceedings pursuant to sub-
poena.2°4 Employers who violate this section can be held in criminal
contempt of court. Although Palmateer was not subpoenaed to appear
at a criminal hearing, he was a witness to a possible crime and agreed
to assist law-enforcement officials in gathering further information.
Despite this difference, the statute verges on legislative approval of
Palmateer's crime-fighting activities. The subpoenaed-crime-witness
statute is a clear expression of legislatively defined public policy favor-
ing citizen crime-fighters. The statute became effective on January 1,
1980, more than six months prior to the appellate court decision and
over fifteen months ahead of the supreme court opinion. If the major-
ity had been aware of the statute's existence, the public policy excep-
tion would have received stronger legislative support.
Further legislative approval (or disapproval) of the public policy
exception can be found in other criminal statutes. For example, in
some special circumstances the refusal of a citizen to come forward
with information respecting criminal wrongdoing may leave that citi-
zen vulnerable to a charge of misprision of felony.20 5 This crime is
defined as concealing a felony committed by another. 20 6 Illinois does
not have a misprision of felony statute; however, it is a crime in Illinois
to compound a crime by agreeing not to prosecute an offender. 20 7 Al-
204. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-3 (Supp. 1982-1983). The subpoenaed-crime-witnesses stat-
ute provides:
§ 8. No employer shall discharge or terminate, or threaten to discharge or termi-
nate, from his employment, or otherwise punish or penalize any employee of his who is a
witness to a crime, because of time lost from regular employment resulting from his
attendance at any proceeding pursuant to subpoena issued in any criminal proceeding
relative to such crime. Any employer who shall knowingly or intentionally violate this
section shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of court. This section shall
not be construed as requiring an employer to pay an employee for time lost resulting
from attendance at any proceeding.
Id. This statute became effective on January 1, 1980. Palmateer's counsel cited the subpoenaed-
crime-witness statute in its brief. Brief for Palmateer at 7, Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 II1. 2d 125, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). The majority apparently either glossed over or inten-
tionally ignored this statute in favor of a panoramic view of the criminal code.
205. See Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedi-
ence." .4 Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 294 (1971).
206. The federal crime of misprision of felony is defined as:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1 (1979). Compounding a crime is defined as:
(a) A person compounds a crime when he receives or offers to another any consideration for a
promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosecution of an offender.
(b) Sentence. Compounding a crime is a petty offense.
Id.
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though the Palmateer court overlooked the statute forbidding com-
pounding a crime, 208 an agreement not to prosecute is against the
public policy of Illinois. 209
There is some indication that the Illinois legislature did not intend
to provide Palmateer with a civil remedy. The legislature enacted two
statutes which prohibit retaliatory discharges relating to garnish-
ments.210 It is uncertain whether the majority should have found that a
legislative enactment protecting certain employee activities should, by
negative implication, preclude a cause of action for wrongful discharge
arising from other employee activities. 21' Regrettably, the legislature
did not state explicitly in these statutes whether the enumerated pro-
tected activities were intended to be exclusive. The majority never
mentioned the two garnishment statutes.
The Palmateer decision is especially noteworthy for the heavy em-
phasis which the court placed on the public policy discouraging viola-
tions of the Criminal Code. The court brushed aside International
Harvester's claim that it ought to be able to fire a managerial employee
"who recklessly and precipitously resorts to the criminal justice sys-
tem" to handle such an internal, personnel problem. 21 2 International
Harvester's business judgment, no matter how sound, cannot override
the General Assembly's decision that even very minor thefts are none-
theless crimes. Where the defined public policy touches upon the
Criminal Code, the terminable-at-will rule must be carefully scruti-
nized.213 The employer is not permitted to take matters into its own
hands by "retaliating against its employees who cooperate in enforc-
208. The majority in Palmateer refers to the Illinois Criminal Code as a whole without specifi-
cally mentioning the statute which prohibits compounding a crime.
209. Murphy v. Rochford, 55 I11. App. 3d 695, 371 N.E.2d 260 (1977) (agreement not to prose-
cute is void as against public policy).
210. The two garnishment statutes provide:
§ 10. No employer may discharge or suspend any employee by reason of the fact
that his earnings have been subjected to wage demands on his employer for any indebt-
edness. Any person violating this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39.11 (1975).
§ 18. No employer may discharge or suspend any employee by reason of the fact
that his earnings have been subjected to a deduction order for any one indebtedness.
Any person violating this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 62, § 88 (1973).
211. "[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy, a court must be chary of reading others into it." Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
express provision of specified powers may imply an intention to withhold those left unmentioned.
2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973).
212. 85 Ill. 2d at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
213. Id.
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ing" the criminal law.214 Thus, although Palmateer extended Kelsay to
a fact situation other than a discharge for filing a workmen's compen-
sation claim, Palmateer may still be confined to circumstances where a
discharge violates well-settled public policy expressed by the legisla-
ture. 215 Unfortunately, dicta in the majority opinion suggests that the
public policy exception can rest on judicial pronouncements as well as
on statutory principles.216
The Majority Opinion: The Creation of an Amorphous Tort
The most problematic aspect of Justice Simon's opinion is the fail-
ure to set forth a workable test for determining when an employer is
free to discharge an employee without the risk of being compelled to
defend a suit for retaliatory discharge. This is particularly disturbing
in light of the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court's stated purpose for
granting this appeal was "to determine the contours of the tort of retali-
atory discharge approved in Kelsay".21 7 Rather than clarifying the fu-
ture application of the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will
rule, the court has only added to the confusion surrounding the scope
and meaning of the exception. 218
The court first speaks approvingly of a balancing test where "the
employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably"
must be balanced against "the employee's interest in earning a liveli-
hood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out. '219
While never expressly rejecting the balancing test, the court never men-
tions it again. Subsequent language in the opinion also suggests that
the balancing test is disfavored. The majority refuses to balance the
employer's right to fire an employee who disrupts the smooth operation
of the plant and acts against the wishes of his employer by going to the
police with the employee's desire to remain employed. Furthermore,
the balancing test cannot be reconciled with the majority's rejection of
International Harvester's argument that "in the exercise of its sound
business judgment it ought to be able to properly fire a managerial em-
ployee who resorts to the criminal justice system to handle" a minor
214. Id. at 133-34, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
215. Note, Contract Law: An Alternative to Tort Law as a Basisfor Wrongful Discharge Actions
in Illinois, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 861, 871 (1981).
216. 85 I11. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
217. Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
218. Justice Ryan, in his dissent, criticized the majority for creating an amorphous tort based
on "some vague concept of public policy that has never been articulated by anyone except four
members of this court." Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 886 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
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crime.220 According to the majority, International Harvester's judg-
ment, no matter how sound, cannot override clearly mandated public
policy discouraging violations of the Illinois Criminal Code.22'
A close reading of the Palmateer opinion reveals that the majority
used a two-part test: first, the employer must discharge the employee in
retaliation for the employee's activities; and second, the discharge must
be in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. 222 The broad
wording of this two-part test gives the impression that the court did not
intend to limit its holding to the facts before it, but rather in dicta in-
tended for the test to be widely applied to future cases. The court could
have addressed the present set of facts without approving such a nebu-
lous two-part test. Henceforth, neither the employer nor the employee
will be able to predict confidently when a discharge violates public pol-
icy. The court, unfortunately, does not explain how this two-part test is
to be applied in future cases. The uncertainty of application and un-
predictability of result of the majority's test can be shown by an
example.
Assume hypothetically that the Illinois Supreme Court were con-
fronted with the same set of facts as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. 223 In Geary, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found that no clear public policy was violated
by the discharge of a salesman who had called his superior's attention
to and had objected to the marketing of a potentially unsafe tubular
product designed for the oil and gas industry. Although the employer
removed the product from the market, the court concluded that "Geary
had made a nuisance of himself' 22 4 by warning of the defect and that
"no clear mandate of public policy was violated" 225 because no statute
covered Geary's conduct. Geary and Palmateer are strikingly similar
in a number of ways. In both cases, the employer discharged the plain-
tiff in retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on alleged wrongdoing in
the workplace. Further, in both cases the plaintiff had taken it upon
himself to become involved in activity which promoted the public's
best interest when it was neither required by law nor by his employ-
220. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
221. Id.
222. The majority stated: "All that is required is that the employer discharge the employee in
retaliation for the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of a clearly
mandated public policy." Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
223. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). For further discussion of Geary and the inherent
vagueness of the term "clearly mandated public policy", see Whisileblowing, supra note 12, at 799-
803; Summers, Timefor a Statute, supra note 5, at 481.
224. 456 Pa. at 180, 319 A.2d at 178.
225. Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
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ment and obviously was against the wishes of his employer. The only
significant differences between the two cases are that in Geary there
were no criminal justice concerns and no statutory provisions which
impliedly encouraged citizen crime-fighters. Assuming the Illinois
Supreme Court found that Geary was discharged in retaliation for
pointing out the defect, 226 the issue would be whether his discharge
contravened a clearly mandated public policy. The Palmateer court
expressly recognized a non-statutory cause of action for an employer's
termination of an at-will employment relationship, 227 and thus, the Illi-
nois court would not be precluded from granting relief. The difficulty
would lie in predicting whether public policy in Illinois favors an em-
ployee who seeks to have what he considers to be an unsafe product
removed from the market. It is unclear from the majority opinion how
far the public policy exception can be extended to cases which present
non-legislatively defined public policy issues that are not criminal in
nature.228 If Palmateer is read broadly as impliedly extending the ex-
ception to any situation where the discharge is even vaguely related to
some public policy expressed in either legislative or judicial pronounce-
ments, Geary would have a cause of action in Illinois. On the other
hand, if Palmateer is read more narrowly as requiring the wrongfully
discharged employee to show that a specific legislative or judicial pro-
nouncement expressly favors employees making safety-oriented judg-
ments, then Geary probably could not invoke the exception.
Regrettably, the supreme court gave no indication of how broadly the
public policy exception should be applied in future cases.
With few exceptions, courts recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful discharge have to some extent relied on statutory expressions
of public policy as a basis for the employee's claim. The Geary court
could not identify any specific statutory source of public policy and
concluded that the general notion that it was the state's public policy to
encourage production of safe products was insufficient. The court ob-
served that although the employee's motivation in making the charges
may have been praiseworthy, that alone could not override "the com-
pany's legitimate interest in preserving its normal operational proce-
226. Note that, as a practical matter, the first part (i.e., a discharge in retaliation for the em-
ployee's activities) of the two-part test will usually not be an issue in the litigation. The second
half of the test is far more likely to be litigated.
227. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
228. The majority suggested that the public policy exception should be broadly applied where
the employee's conduct touches upon a possible violation of the criminal laws. 85 Il. 2d at 133,
421 N.E.2d at 880.
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dures from disruption." 229 The critical difference between Geary and
Palmateer is the latter's concern for the promotion of the criminal jus-
tice system. The Palmateer court observed that where the motivation
for the employee's discharge touches on the Illinois Criminal Code, the
employer's prerogative will not be balanced with the employee's crime-
fighting responsibilities.
If Palmateer is restricted to its holding, the majority is certainly
correct in concluding that public policy favors citizen crime-fighters.
The problem, however, arises when the majority then goes on to adopt
the two-part test by way of dicta. The second part of the test requires
that "the discharge be in contravention of a clearly mandated public
policy. ' 230 Public policy is a nebulous concept, having no clear and
definite boundaries. 231 The vagueness of the concept will result in fre-
quent litigation over which activities should be protected by the tort
action. The Palmateer court has attempted to define and expand public
policy on its own, without legislative guidance. In the court's peregri-
nations, it has of necessity wandered into virgin territory. The court
has not shed new light onto the murky terrain of public policy. The
best that can be said of Palmateer is that it provides some guidelines for
drawing the outer limits of the tort action for wrongful discharge. The
difficulty remains in determining whether a discharge is actionable
when it does not concern the Criminal Code.
By creating an amorphous tort based on vague notions of public
policy, the majority has opened the courthouse door to every employee
who claims he has been wrongfully discharged in contravention of
"some vague concept of public policy that has never been articulated
by anyone except" the supreme court.232 As a consequence of the
Palmateer decision, the public policy exception is now in a quagmire.
The public policy exception will prompt an ad hoc in-court examina-
tion of each claimant's position, imposing onerous burdens of proof
regarding what constitutes public policy upon both the employer and
the employee. In this regard, the lower courts will recognize that the
229. 456 Pa. at 183, 319 A.2d at 180 (footnote omitted).
230. 85 Ill. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
231. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977). In Hinrichs, an em-
ployee was discharged because she refused to falsify medical records. Id. at 1131. The court
found the concept of public policy too vague a basis for the creation of a new tort and therefore
held that the issue was best left to the legislature. Id.
232. 85 Ill. 2d at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 886 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan prophesied that
employers may discharge employees "only at the risk of being compelled to defend a suit for
retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive damages." Id. at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881, quoling,
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 192, 384 N.E.2d 353, 362 (1978) (Underwood, J.,
dissenting).
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once mighty legislatively defined public policy has been seriously
eroded by Palmateer. The lower courts will undoubtedly adopt a myr-
iad of conflicting positions so that an individual discharge case will
have little, if any, precedential value. Faced then with inconsistent
lower court decisions, the supreme court may yet have another oppor-
tunity to define the nebulous term, "clearly mandated public policy".
Confusion over the validity and scope of the public policy exception
will hopefully be resolved by the legislative process.
The Palmateer decision is at once both a logical extension of the
well-defined public policy exception first announced in Kelsay and an
unwarranted expansion of the exception based on vague notions of
public policy found only in judicial opinions. On the one hand, the
public policy in Palmateer, as in Kelsay, was evidenced by a statute
which established the parameters of the exception. On the other hand,
by suggesting a discharge is actionable whenever it contravenes clearly
mandated public policy, the Palmateer majority has clearly gone be-
yond the statutory basis relied on in Kelsay. Perhaps Justice Simon
wrote a deliberately confusing opinion with the expectation that em-
ployers would not be able to predict precisely how broadly the public
policy exception would be applied in future cases. In this way the tort
of retaliatory discharge would effectively curb employer misconduct
and coercion in the workplace. The majority has sent a clear message
to employers that abusive discharges will no longer be tolerated. The
fact that the public policy exception has not been articulated by the
legislature is no longer an available defense for employers doing busi-
ness in Illinois. Henceforth, lower courts may examine judicial prece-
dent in determining the contours of the exception.
The Dissenting Opinion: The Balancing Test
In stark contrast to the amorphous public policy exception en-
dorsed by the majority, Justice Ryan argued for a balancing test which
takes into account the interests of both employer and employee. 233 By
advocating a balancing test, Justice Ryan recognized that the tort of
retaliatory discharge is a departure from the traditional rule that an
employment contract for an indefinite time may be terminated by
233. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. See also Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (court weighed the employee's interest in making a living, the
employer's interest in running its business, its motive in discharging the employee and its manner
of effecting the discharge, with any social interests or public policies that may be implicated in the
discharge).
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either party at any time and for any reason.234 If employers are going
to be permitted to operate their businesses efficiently and profitably,
then the at-will rule must remain viable. This can only happen when
courts adopt the balancing test.
The balancing test recognizes an at-will employee's interest in job
security, particularly when continued employment is threatened not by
genuine dissatisfaction with job performance but because the employee
has refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to perform a
statutorily prescribed duty. Equally to be considered is that the em-
ployer has an important interest in being able to discharge an at-will
employee whenever it would be beneficial to his business. Finally, so-
ciety as a whole has an interest in ensuring that its laws and important
public policies are not contravened. Any modification of the at-will
rule must take into account all of these interests. The balancing test
weighs all of these conflicting interests and attempts to reach an equita-
ble result.
As Ryan points out, the problem with the majority opinion is that
it fosters speculation as to what is the supreme court's view of public
policy. The majority held that the public policy exception may be ex-
tended to situations not covered by legislation if the court is convinced
that some established public policy is undermined by an employer's
discharge practices. 235 Justice Ryan argued convincingly that the ma-
jority should have exercised judicial self-restraint. He noted that the
majority stretched the exception too far by converting a statutory pro-
hibition 236 into a judicially created affirmative duty to come forward
and assist in a criminal investigation. Justice Ryan steadfastly main-
tained that if the legislature had intended that citizens should become
involved in crime fighting, it would have enacted appropriate legisla-
tion. According to Justice Ryan, the majority has simply substituted its
preference for the considered judgment of the General Assembly.
The Advantages of the Balancing Test
The dissent's balancing test is preferable to the majority's two-part
test for three reasons. First, the balancing test avoids the possibility of
extending the new tort into the "nebulous area of judicially created
public policy" by requiring that support for the cause of action be
found in legislative enactments. 237 By requiring a statutory basis for
234. Id. at 142, 421 N.E.2d at 884. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 150-61.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 162-71.
237. Id. at 142, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
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the public policy exception, the dissent ensures the gradual growth of
the tort of retaliatory discharge which is still in its infancy. The second
part of the majority's two-part test-the discharge must be in contra-
vention of a clearly mandated public policy-increases the possibility
that the exception may completely absorb the at-will rule.
Second, the majority's two-part test will have an adverse impact
on the business community in Illinois. Afraid that any discharge may
be actionable, employers will be reluctant to fire disruptive employees
who threaten to file a lawsuit if released. With the advent of punitive
damages awarded to the discharged employee, there is a danger of life-
tenured employment for the unwanted worker. The dissent points out
that the disgruntled employee could seriously interfere with labor rela-
tions and, in the case of citizen crime-fighters, impair the company's
internal security program. 238 The employer's legitimate interests in
conducting his business "and employing and retaining the best person-
nel available cannot be unjustifiably impaired. ' 239 In recognizing this
new tort, a proper balance must be maintained between the employee's
interest in earning his livelihood and the employer's interest in operat-
ing his business efficiently and profitably. The employer's ability to
make employment business decisions may be chilled or at least stymied
by the nebulous public policy exception.
Third, the majority's two-part test creates the possibility of a
potential floodgate of litigation based onjudicial notions of the scope of
the public policy exception. While the majority's goal in protecting at-
will employees from abusive discharges is laudable, the inherent vague-
ness of judicially designed public policy poses a bevy of practical
problems for employers and employees. Because of its statutory basis
the balancing test should help to curtail vexatious lawsuits brought by
discharged employees who fabricate "plausible tales of employer
coercion." 240
A STATUTORY APPROACH FOR WHISTLEBLOWING EMPLOYEES
One possible alternative to the public policy exception would be
the enactment of a statute which protects "whistle-blowing" employees.
Michigan recently enacted a statute which may serve as a model for
creating a legislative definition of protected activity upon which an em-
238. Id. at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 144, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting), quoting, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 341, 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979).
240. 85 Ill. 2d at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting), quoting, Blades, supra note 5, at
1428.
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ployee's cause of action may be based.241 The Whistleblowers' Protec-
tion Act protects an employee who engages in "whistle-blowing"
activities by providing that an employer shall not discharge or threaten
to discharge an employee who reports a suspected violation of federal
or state laws or regulations. 242 The Michigan statute specifically pro-
vides that a wrongfully discharged employee may bring a civil action
for injunctive relief and/or actual damages. 243 The statute does not
provide for an award of punitive damages. The employee is required
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was about to report a
possible violation of state or federal law.244 The Michigan statute gives
the court wide latitude in fashioning an appropriate remedy, including
reinstatement, back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and sen-
iority rights, and actual damages. 245 The state can also impose a civil
241. The Whistleblowers' Protection Act became effective on March 31, 1981 by 1980 Mich.
Pub. Acts 469. For an excellent summary of the Act, see G. Murg & C. Scharman, Employment At
Will Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 350 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule]; Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower From Retaliatory Discharge,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. - (1983) (author points out that the Michigan statute was intended to
enable the government to rely on employees in enforcing federal, state and local statutes and
regulations and to that end is designed to encourage whistleblowing; however, employees dis-
charged while pursuing internal channels may not be protected by the statute).
242. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (1980). The statute protects a "whistle-blowing" employee
from a retaliatory discharge:
Sec. 2. An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against
an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the
employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected
violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state or the United States to a public body, unless the em-
ployee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public
body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a
court action.
Id.
243. Id. § 15.363. The statute sets forth the legal and equitable remedies available to the at-
will employee threatened by a retaliatory termination:
Sec. 3. (1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for
appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occur-
rence of the alleged violation of this act.
(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit
court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the com-
plainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed
resides or has their principal place of business.
(3) As used in subsection (I), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused
by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney fees.
(4) An employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that they or a person
acting on their behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a sus-
pected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United
States to a public body.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 15.364.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
fine not to exceed five hundred dollars. 246 The statute does not impair
the employee's or employer's rights under any collective bargaining
agreement. 247 An employer is required to post notices informing his
employees of their rights under the statute.248 Finally, a successful
plaintiff may recover attorneys' and witnesses' fees. 249
The Michigan approach of legislatively establishing the public
policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule is vastly superior to the
adhoc approach currently adopted in Illinois. 25 0 The Michigan statute
essentially codifies the balancing test advocated by the dissent. This
statutory approach should be adopted by the Illinois General Assembly
to provide a uniform and predictable growth of the public policy excep-
tion which is still in its infancy.
CONCLUSION
For too many years, the at-will employee has been vulnerable to
capricious or retaliatory discharge. Recently, a few courts have used
contract or tort theories to limit the harsh application of the common
law doctrine of terminable-at-will employment in cases where em-
ployee termination would contravene some aspect of public policy. In
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., the Illinois Supreme Court
held that an employee may maintain a tort action for retaliatory dis-
charge when the employer discharges the employee in retaliation for
the employee's conduct and the discharge contravenes clearly man-
dated public policy. The majority maintained that public policy favors
citizen crime-fighters. The dissent criticized the majority for approving
a non-statutory public policy exception to the at-will rule. By prompt-
ing an expansion of an employee's right to sue his employer for wrong-
ful discharge, the majority has cleared the way for a potential flood of
litigation based on vague notions of public policy.
246. Id. § 15.365.
247. Id. § 15.366.
248. Id. § 15.368.
249. Id. § 15.364.
250. See Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule, supra note 241, at 350.

